| 1. | The relation of principal and agent is ordinarily created by agreement of the parties
委托人和代理人的关系一般是通过双方的协议产生的。 |
| 2. | Discussing the influence of quasi - official client and attorney to the state - owned corporation ' s adjustment structure
政府化的委托人和代理人对国有企业治理结构的影响 |
| 3. | The authority of the agent to act for and bind the principal is the very essence of the principal and agent relationship
代理人以代理权为委托人行事同时委托人受此约束是委托人和代理人关系的本质。 |
| 4. | In the model principal and agent are both assumed to be risk avoidable . and we have brought implicit incentive such as reputation mechanism and pay postposition into the model
在模型中,假设委托人和代理人均是风险规避性的,并将声誉机制、后置报酬等隐性激励也纳入模型中。 |
| 5. | In the analysis framework of agency costs , the contract relationship is summed up a principal - agent relationship . because the object functions of principals and agents are not unanimous , it leads to interests conflict between them and relevant agency costs
在代理成本的分析框架中,契约关系被归结为一种委托代理关系,由于委托人和代理人的目标函数不一致而导致了他们之间的利益冲突与相应的代理成本。 |
| 6. | Corporate govemance targets the problem of the corresponding systematic arrangement of the two contracting parties to ensure the principais " rights and avoid the abuses of agents . the theory of corporate governance stems from abroad in l9705 and l980s when a lot of researches in the area were conducted in developed countries
从经济学的理性假设出发，委托人和代理人具有不同的目标选择和价值取向，为了确保委托人的权益不被侵害和滥用，两者的契约关系需要制度上的相应安排，这就是公司治理所要解决的问题。 |
| 7. | Based on the game theory and the main theories of information economics , the relationship between the appointer and the agent in railway property operation was studies ; the relationship between the state and the ministry of railways , and between the ministry of railways and the enterprise was analyzed ; and the method of how to decide the base number under either stable and random circumstances in the commission operation of railway property was studied ; and both the agent ' s interests mechanism in property operation and how to fix the optimizing contract and the optimal strategy under random circumstances were studies also
本文以博奕论和信息经济学中的主要结论为基础，对铁路资产经营中委托人和代理人之间的关系进行了研究，然后对国家与铁道部、铁道部与企业进行了资产经营的博奕分析；分别在稳定和随机环境下对铁路资产委托代理经营中基数的确定办法进行了研究；并对资产经营中代理人（承包人）的利益机制和随机环境下最优合同与最优策略的确定进行了分析。 |
| 8. | Risk and cost of surrogate emerge according to the situations . so it is necessary to constitute standardized supervision & control mechanism . corporate governance is the appropriate one to realize the balance of power so as to ensure consigner ' s rights and interests , and to guarantee the efficiency and the effect of prosecution
然而，委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称、契约不完全和责任不对等，会影响经营效率和效果，代理风险和代理成本应运而生，为此需要在契约关系内部构建规范化、制度化的监督和控制机制? ?公司治理结构来实现对权力的制衡，确保委托人的权益并保证经营效果。 |
| 9. | Eso system is a system that bases on making profit from both human resources and substance capital , illustrating that the demand on the deployment of economic system and legislation system for human resources . from the relationship among main bodies in company ' s managing , the theory of agency argues that shareholder is trustor and manage is trustee , then the cost of agency is produced due to the difference between their goals . eso system evaluating the company by its value , which diminishes the long term profit difference between executive and stockholder , solves the contradiction between trustor and trustee in the relation of agency , and decreases the cost
股票期权制度就是建立在人力资本和物力资本共同创造利润的立论基础上的一种制度，它体现了人力资本在知识经济时代对经济制度、法律制度的安排提出的必然要求；从公司运营中各主体的关系来看，委托代理理论认为股东是委托人，高级管理人员是代理人，两者之间因存在目标不一致而产生代理成本，股票期权制度以公司价值为考核目标，使得经理人与股东利益长期一致，在委托代理关系中解决委托人和代理人之间的矛盾，从而减少代理成本；从公司运营中的治理结构来看，公司治理理论认为公司安全高效的运行需要合理的分权制衡和有效的约束激励，二者缺一不可。 |
| 10. | The owners ( shareholders ) and the executives of a business are principals and agents . therefore , there are so called " agency problems " between them , such as " different objectives and interests " , " disproportional control of information " , and " disproportional responsibilities and risks "
企业的所有者(股东)和企业的经营者之间的关系，是委托人和代理人的关系，这样，在两者之间就存在“目标利益不一致” ， “信息控制不对称” ， “责任风险不对称”的所谓的“代理问题” 。 |
